When Safeguards Falter
What Recent External Lab Inquiries Reveal About the Fragility—and Strength—of Forensic Systems
Written by Michelle Madrid and Tara Luther, Promega.
This article was generated with the assistance of artificial intelligence. However, all content has been thoroughly reviewed and curated by a human editor before posting to guarantee accuracy, relevance, and quality.
Share this article
Image generated with the assistance of AI
In forensic DNA analysis, the real measure of our work isn’t the technology we use, it’s the trust in the findings we report. That trust hinges on the strength of our systems, the clarity of our leadership, and the health of our culture. When any of these elements fracture, the consequences ripple well beyond the lab bench—undermining public confidence, compromising cases, and placing a heavy burden on an already overstretched workforce.
Over the past two decades, a growing body of audit reports, internal investigations, and independent inquiries have demonstrated points of vulnerability within forensic systems. These external inquiries, or independent reviews, are typically conducted by third parties following significant failures or allegations of misconduct in forensic labs. While the specific circumstances vary, these reports consistently point out systemic issues such as weak leadership, organizational silos, lack of accountability, and a culture of fear or silence. These cases aren’t just examples of individual misconduct. They reveal how organizational pressure, workplace culture, and structural weaknesses can compound.
For lab directors and quality managers, these reports offer more than a retrospective analysis. They provide an opportunity for us to stop and think about how systems that appear fine on the surface can go off course—and what can be done to strengthen them before they reach the point of systemic failure.
Culture Is the Foundation—and the First Warning Sign
Across many high-profile lab failures, the more visible breakdowns were often traced back to deeper issues related to workplace culture. In several forensic units reviewed through public inquiries and internal audits, analysts described environments where questioning authority was discouraged, and in some cases, directly penalized. Staff feared retaliation or dismissal for raising concerns, particularly when those concerns challenged longstanding procedures or colleagues with greater seniority or those perceived as high-performers¹. Fear erodes trust and stifles innovation, both of which are vital to any organization. A healthy culture within a forensic service provider (FSSP) shifts the focus away from blame and fosters an environment where errors are seen as opportunities to learn, not reasons for punishment.²
One external audit found that analysts felt caught between maintaining scientific rigor and satisfying casework expectations. Employees reported divided allegiances, and their hesitancy to speak up was reinforced by a lack of clear follow-up when issues were raised¹. Another inquiry described a workplace where innovation programs existed but lacked meaningful implementation, leading staff to feel their voices were heard only symbolically³. The Houston Forensic Science Center provides an example of how symbolic reforms can be restructured into operational change through leadership separation and continuous blind testing.
In response, several of these same reports emphasized the importance of psychological safety—the belief that individuals can speak up with questions, concerns, or mistakes without fear of punishment or humiliation. As noted in the NIST Human Factors Report, promoting psychological safety is essential in forensic environments, where high-consequence decisions depend on open communication and the ability to report errors without retribution.² To support this, more confidential reporting mechanisms are encouraged along with clearer escalation paths, and the creation of internal ombudsman positions that foster open dialogue and independent support within the lab structure.¹
Leadership Response Defines System Resilience
In many documented cases, the systems that should have caught or escalated concerns were technically in place—but failed to operate as intended. An internal affairs investigation in one state found that technical staff raised concerns about testing anomalies nearly a decade before formal action was taken⁴. A 2018 review acknowledged those concerns, but the findings were not elevated to executive leadership, and the employee in question was eventually reinstated. It wasn’t until an intern, tasked with a routine research assignment, uncovered data inconsistencies that a deeper investigation was triggered⁴.
Elsewhere, analysts flagged the unusually high productivity of a colleague whose output far exceeded lab norms. The analyst’s performance was celebrated for years before external scrutiny revealed significant deviations from standard protocols⁵. The Colorado Bureau of Investigation’s 2025 audit revealed an example where red flags about a high-output DNA analyst went unaddressed for nearly a decade—a failure stemming from managerial inaction and misplaced trust.
In these reviews, auditors often emphasized the need for leadership training—not only in crisis response but in proactive empathetic listening. Recommendations included integrating executive leaders more closely with technical teams, creating clearer documentation protocols for upward communication, and supporting mid-level supervisors with training in personnel management, rather than simply task delegation¹.
The Unseen Risks of Over-Performance
Multiple reports have highlighted how long-standing trust in high-output analysts can lead to a reluctance to question their results. In one review, an analyst admitted to omitting control tests and selectively interpreting data to increase daily case throughput. In more than 30 sexual assault cases, this analyst had removed or downplayed trace male DNA indicators that warranted further review, instead reporting no DNA present⁴.
Other investigations uncovered situations where experienced examiners were trusted to self-review or finalize results without peer verification. These practices, while rooted in perceived efficiency, were found to deviate from best practices for transparency and reproducibility⁴.
Several of these inquiries emphasized the need for workflow equity, blind peer review, and rotation of assignments to reduce over-reliance on individual contributors. Some recommended using objective case complexity scoring to distribute workloads more evenly and to encourage collaboration over competition⁴.
Throughput Pressure and Informal Quotas
In lab environments under pressure to reduce backlogs or turn cases around quickly, analysts have described unspoken expectations and implicit pressures to meet case quotas or productivity targets that were difficult to reconcile with technical standards. One audit found that staff felt incentivized to prioritize “easy” cases over more complex or time-consuming work. In some units, productivity was reportedly the primary metric of value, leading to disparities in caseloads which, over time, lowered staff morale⁶.
Auditors in these cases recommended a reframing of performance evaluation—moving away from pure output metrics toward balanced measures that include technical accuracy, case complexity, and contributions to mentoring or validation efforts. Some reports encouraged labs to establish casework dashboards that allow leadership to monitor not just volume, but quality and equity in real time⁷.
Quality Systems in Practice vs. Quality Systems on Paper
Even in accredited environments, many labs experienced challenges in making their quality systems accessible and actionable. In one audit, technical staff lacked visibility into quality incident reports (QIRs), limiting their ability to spot recurring trends or connect their own observations to broader concerns. Quality data was siloed, and routine non-conformities were not systematically addressed through root cause analysis⁴.
In another case—including an annual review of UK forensic labs by the Forensic Science Regulator—Quality Assurance (QA) oversight was functionally detached from day-to-day operations, with little formal integration between quality staff and bench scientists.⁷,⁸ As a result, opportunities for early correction were missed, and some deviations became normalized over time⁴.
Following these findings, some institutions expanded access to QIR databases, implemented inter-disciplinary technical review boards, and increased transparency around internal audits and corrective actions. Others developed initiatives to embed QA liaisons within technical teams, promoting collaboration over mere compliance.⁴
As documented in the 2018 Annual Report, QA independence and lack of day to day sequencing with technical staff created a blind spot in routine oversight.
Infrastructure and Governance: The Hidden Constraints
A number of assessments highlighted challenges in infrastructure and governance that affected lab performance. In several regions, forensic staff cited outdated or inconsistently used Laboratory Information Management Systems (LIMS), and a lack of dedicated IT support left analysts responsible for troubleshooting or maintaining their own data systems⁸. These gaps introduced delays, increased the risk of human error, and limited auditability.
Shared governance models also presented complications. Where lab operations were co-managed with external agencies, staff sometimes faced conflicting priorities. For example, when investigatory timelines pressured analytical decisions. Recommendations in these cases often focused on clarifying decision-making authority, streamlining organizational charts, and increasing lab autonomy in personnel and policy matters⁴.
Some labs ultimately underwent structural reorganizations to better insulate scientific decision-making from operational pressures. Others established stakeholder advisory panels to balance transparency with scientific independence.
What These Reports Tell Us—And What They Don’t
Across all of these assessments, a consistent theme emerges: forensic labs are deeply human systems. The most robust protocols and policies are only as strong as the culture that underpins them-a culture where speaking up is safe, accountability is shared, and leadership actively invites scrutiny rather than resists it.
While these reports don’t offer a one-size-fits-all solution, they provide a clear path forward: one of continuous improvement, where systems are designed not for static perfection, but to evolve and strengthen precisely because of how they confront and learn from adversity.
References:
- Queensland Government. (2022). Commission of Inquiry into Forensic DNA Testing in Queensland – Final Report (Sofronoff Report, including Chapter 6).https://www.health.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0036/1196685/final-report-coi-dna-testing-qld-dec-2022.pdf
- Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Forensic DNA Interpretation. (2024). Forensic DNA Interpretation and Human Factors: Improving Practice Through a Systems Approach (NIST IR 8503). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8503
- Stout, P. (2023). The Secret Life of Crime Labs. PNAS, 120(41), e2303592120. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2303592120
- Colorado Bureau of Investigation. (2025, July 8). Forensic Services Audit and Assessment Report. Prepared by Forward Resolutions. https://cbi.colorado.gov/sites/cbi/files/CBI_ForensicServicesAuditandAssessmentFinalReport_20250708.pdf
- Justia Law. (1993). In the Matter of: West Virginia State Police Crime Lab (Fred Zain). Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/1993/21973.html
- National Institute of Justice. (2019). Workload and Stress in Public Forensic Laboratories: A Needs Assessment. https://www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1228306/download
- Texas Forensic Science Commission. (2021). Annual Report: Enhancing Metrics and Casework Transparency in Public Labs. https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1453243/tenth-annual-report-11112021.pdf
- Forensic Science Regulator (UK). (2020, September 22). Annual Report 2018 (Review of QA integration and oversight). GOV.UK. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/918342/FSRAnnual_Report_2018.pdf