Authors: Sara Huston¹,²,³, Diana Madden¹,³ Affiliations: ¹Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children’s Hospital of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA ²Department of Pediatrics, Northwestern Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois, USA ³DNA Bridge, Durham, North Carolina, USA

A Trip to Kyiv to Learn About the Systems

In the past, large-scale DNA identification efforts have been post-conflict endeavors, as in Argentina, Bosnia, and El Salvador. By contrast, Ukraine’s DNA-based death investigations are developing during an ongoing war, placing it alongside Israel’s post-October 7, 2023 identifications as one of the few contemporary cases of forensic DNA is happening as the war continues. In addition to the unprecedented number of missing (thus far), Ukraine also faces the large-scale forcible separations of children. In this context, DNA is being collected proactively from relatives of missing children to serve as a reference resource for future identifications and family reunifications.

It is this latter, novel situation that prompted us to visit Kyiv last year to understand how the DNA outreach processes are working and to learn about the barriers to using DNA for the families of the kidnapped Ukrainian children.

Our engagement with Ukraine’s missing persons infrastructure has developed over several years. In June 2023, the discussions at an International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) panel in The Hague underscored the scale of wartime identification challenges, with one panelist discussing the crisis of the missing children. The following year, we secured funding to collaborate with the ICMP to co-develop a dedicated roundtable on the Ukrainian children.

We then embarked on a two-year research study (2024-26) in Ukraine and Poland to examine how DNA is currently used in conflict-based missing persons investigations and where systems falter, especially in the context of the separated children. The goal of our research is to inform global systems needed not just in Ukraine, but also now in Sudan, Syria, and beyond.³ Our research data on trust, attitudes on DNA, and political perspectives is under evaluation and will be shared when fully analyzed. But along with the formal research study, we are learning about the processes, including who is authorized to collect DNA, how remains are handled, and how information moves among organizations. We share here some observations, in hopes of fostering solutions among the forensic DNA community.

What DNA is Being Used For

DNA supports multiple, overlapping identification needs in Ukraine, including pre-emptive DNA collection for military personnel, identification of both civilian and military deaths, verification of presumed identities, family reference DNA collection for those missing and presumed deceased, and family reference DNA collection for missing prisoners of war and children taken during the conflict.

These categories matter because they rely on different timelines and assumptions. Death investigations require comparison between remains and reference samples, whereas living reunifications often require DNA to be collected years before a match is possible. The effectiveness of DNA in any of these contexts depends less on technology than the availability of reference samples, whether they can be compared across institutions, and whether families trust the process enough to participate.

Expanding Capacity

Ukraine’s forensic DNA capacity has expanded rapidly. The number of operational laboratories increased from nine in 2022 to twenty by August 2025.⁴ Challenging cases can be referred to the ICMP for re-testing, and a large number of rapid DNA equipment has been donated to support specific identification scenarios. This infrastructure growth reflects significant investment and international commitment during wartime.

Family reference DNA collection is a major bottleneck. Under current regulations, only recognized forensic experts are authorized to collect reference DNA samples. Such experts are in short supply within Ukraine, so families are waiting months before they can provide DNA samples. Even when rapid DNA instruments are available, their use is limited to casework with an identification hypothesis, so they are used primarily for scenarios akin to “closed disasters,” like a destroyed apartment building with a known resident list.

Finally, in Ukraine, missing persons cases are investigated based on the individual’s place of residence, making outreach and coordination exceedingly difficult since jurisdictions cannot easily centralize casework.

The challenges described here should not obscure the extraordinary progress achieved by Ukrainian authorities under wartime conditions. In the span of three years, Ukraine has built, expanded, and sustained a national forensic DNA infrastructure while under continuous attack. Laboratories have multiplied, reporting systems have been consolidated, and identification efforts have proceeded despite damaged facilities, personnel shortages, and ongoing security risks. That thousands of individuals have already been identified under these conditions reflects a remarkable institutional and scientific effort.

Nameless Victims

One of the most striking observations from our conversations and learning about the situation concerns the return of human remains from Russia. At the start of the conflict only a few bodies were exchanged between the country’s authorities at a time, especially since international agreements we slow to develop. Now, victims’ bodies are returned in massive shipments. A single shipment arrived in June 2025 with 6,057 fallen soldiers,⁴ 14,480 total in 2025,⁵ and another 1,000 remains in January 2026.⁶ We have been told that the human remains often appear intentionally fragmented, making identification extremely difficult and some have reportedly arrived wearing Russian uniforms. Military identifications are underway, but since Ukraine does not operate a dedicated military DNA laboratory, identification relies on the civilian forensic infrastructure.

Voluntary pre-emptive DNA collection among service members began in January 2024. By September 2025, approximately 25 percent of military personnel had provided samples. Efforts are ongoing to increase coverage, particularly near the front lines, but participation remains low, with recent reports indicating only one-third of Armed Forces members want to participate due to superstition that providing a DNA sample is bad luck.⁷ Moreover, families frequently distrust missing persons reports and request retesting, which is supported and facilitated by the Ukrainian authorities in hopes of earning public trust in the DNA testing processes.

The Challenges with Applying DNA for the Families of the Children Taken into Russia

The challenges of DNA-based identification are particularly acute for the children taken into Russia. At least 1,859 have been returned as of December 2025,⁸ with each returned child providing evidence of their kidnapping and treatment while captive. Yet tracing individual children among the thousands is exceedingly difficult, especially since many of these children were orphans or had special needs, and some may not have close relatives actively searching for them. The Yale Humanitarian Research Laboratory has documented through open-source investigations at least 314 children placed within Russia for adoption or foster care, or into institutional systems.⁹ Many were renamed and naturalized as Russian citizens. Thousands of other cases remain unverified, and yet the true number of affected children is potentially much higher than 20,000.²

Many of these children might not be found or come forward for years or decades, and many relatives reside in inaccessible occupied territories. For this reason, identification does not begin with testing a child, but with collecting DNA reference samples from both close and distant relatives in accessible regions of Ukraine and securely storing those profiles so they can be compared if and when a child is located or comes forward. Without a coordinated humanitarian framework for reference-based DNA systems, these future identifications remain contingent on ad hoc cooperation and uncertain data governance. While DNA has been taken from parents and relatives of the missing children, samples are not collected specifically with an assumption that the children are alive, so lack of documentation makes it difficult to know how many relatives of taken children have provided DNA reference samples.

What is needed

What emerged most clearly from our visit to Kyiv was the need for expertise, consumables, and trauma-informed processes. Regarding consumables, the Ukrainian authorities specifically requested: (1) DNA sampling swabs with preservatives for transport and long-term storage; and (2) Rapid DNA cartridges for the many machines that they have on hand. They do not need more equipment, and internal capacity is expanding. However, they do need assistance with forensic DNA expertise and with developing processes to foster trust.

Ukraine’s experience illustrates the need for DNA systems designed specifically for humanitarian identification rather than just repurposed from criminal justice contexts. Such systems require clear limits on use, transparent governance, separation from law enforcement objectives, and cross-border legal frameworks that enable comparison while protecting rights.

Building Forward